How does a California landlord lawfully end a tenancy, and when may a tenant leave early?

The just-cause answer differs by city. A property covered by a local just-cause ordinance adopted on or before September 1, 2019, or by a later ordinance that qualifies as more protective, is governed by that ordinance instead of the state statute, and a property is never subject to both. Everywhere else the state statute in section 1946.2 supplies the ground requirement for tenants who have lived there long enough. Separately, in a city or county that runs a rent-control system with rent registration, an owner who ends a tenancy to move in must actually live there for at least six continuous months under section 1947.10; outside those places that duty does not exist. The notice periods, holdover, mitigation, fee, survivor, military and abandonment answers are the same everywhere in the state.

The switch is the local ordinance and its adoption date. An ordinance adopted on or before September 1, 2019 applies of its own force. An ordinance adopted or amended after that date applies only if it is consistent with the state statute, is more limiting on the reasons for termination or more generous on relocation or tenant protections, and carries a binding finding in the ordinance itself that it is more protective; a later ordinance that is less protective cannot be enforced. A reader finds out by checking the city or county's own rent-stabilization or just-cause ordinance and whether it registers rents. The city-by-city detail is carried on the locality pages, not here.

The switch changes: is a reason required.

Landlord: 60 days. Tenant: 30 days.

The residential rule in section 1946.1 works from the termination date backwards: the notice names the date the tenancy is to end and must be given at least 60 days, or 30 days on the short tiers, before that date. Nothing requires the date to fall at the end of a rental period. The older general rule in section 1946 says a month-to-month tenancy may be ended "at any time" on at least 30 days' written notice, with rent "due and payable to and including the date of termination", so that count runs forward from delivery and the last month's rent is prorated. The one place a period boundary matters is a periodic tenancy shorter or longer than a month under section 1946: there the notice must be given as long before the end of the current period as the period itself, capped at 30 days, so a week-to-week tenancy takes seven days and ends when the week ends. A tenant who receives an owner's notice may answer with a notice of the tenant's own ending the tenancy earlier, so long as the tenant's notice runs at least one full rental period.

The termination date may fall on any day.

Tiers: The owner's period turns on how long the household has been there. Sixty days is the rule. It drops to 30 days if a tenant or resident has lived in the dwelling, or occupied the property, for less than one year — the test is per person, so one occupant under a year takes the whole household to 30 days. It also drops to 30 days on a sale tier that has six conditions, all of which must hold: the unit is separately sellable; the owner has contracted to sell it to a good-faith buyer and opened escrow with a title insurer; the buyer is a natural person; the notice is given no more than 120 days after escrow opened; no notice under the section was given to the tenant before; and the buyer in good faith intends to live there for at least one full year. The tenant's period does not tier at all: a tenant gives notice for at least as long as the rental period, which is 30 days on a month-to-month tenancy however long the tenant has lived there. Under the older general rule a periodic tenancy that is not month-to-month takes a notice as long as its own period, capped at 30 days, and a single lodger in an owner-occupied home follows the same lengths, with the lodger's right to stay ending by operation of law when the notice period runs out.

The parties may agree to a different period. The older general rule in section 1946 lets the parties agree, and only at the time the tenancy is created, that notice may be given as little as seven days before the end of the term; that is the one express shortening California allows, and it runs both ways. Section 1946.1, which supplies the 60-day and 30-day residential tiers, contains no agreement clause and no anti-waiver clause, so it says nothing either way. A second statute, section 1953, makes void any provision of a dwelling lease by which the tenant gives up a right to a notice required by law, and voids a waiver of other statutory rights unless the lease was handed to the tenant before the tenant took possession. No California appellate decision reconciles the seven-day agreement clause with that bar, so a shortened period agreed at the start of a tenancy is on uncertain ground.

Source of the period: a termination-notice statute states it.

An owner ending a month-to-month tenancy gives written notice at least 60 days before the termination date the notice names, or at least 30 days if any tenant or resident has been there less than a year, or 30 days on the six-condition sale tier described above. A tenant gives notice for at least as long as the rental period, which is 30 days on a month-to-month tenancy, and a tenant who has received the owner's notice may give a notice of the tenant's own for an earlier date. The periods are set out in section 1946.1, which opens with the words "Notwithstanding Section 1946" and, since 2024, covers both residential dwellings and qualified commercial tenants; the residential figures come from the subdivisions that name a residential dwelling. The older section 1946 still supplies the flat 30-day rule for a month-to-month tenancy ended "at any time", the period-length rule capped at 30 days for other periodic tenancies, and the lodger rule. Neither section requires the notice to state a reason, but where the just-cause statute covers the tenancy the notice must state the ground as well. Neither a landlord nor an agent may charge a tenant a fee for serving, posting, or otherwise delivering the notice. The notice does not have to end the tenancy at the close of a rental period; rent is owed to and including the termination date.

Only for a defined subset of tenancies. The ground requirement attaches once a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied the home for 12 months.

How a tenancy comes inside the rule: coverage turns on how long the tenant has been there.

Who is covered: Where extra adult tenants joined the lease before an existing tenant reached 24 months, it attaches only if all of the tenants have been there 12 months or more, or one has been there 24 months or more. Nine classes are exempt: transient hotel occupancy; a nonprofit hospital, religious facility, extended care facility, licensed residential care facility for the elderly, or adult residential facility; school and college dormitories; a share of a home where the tenant shares a bathroom or kitchen with the owner living there; an owner-occupied single-family residence where the owner rents no more than two units or bedrooms, including a granny flat, and a mobilehome; a two-unit building where the owner has lived in one unit since the tenancy began and still does; housing issued a certificate of occupancy within the previous 15 years, which is a rolling test a building can age out of; a separately sellable home whose owner is not a real estate investment trust, a corporation, or a limited liability company with a corporate member, but only if the owner gave the tenant the exact statutory exemption notice; and deed-restricted or subsidized affordable housing. The statute reaches a mobilehome tenancy but not a mobilehome owner who rents only the lot.

No-fault grounds: Four grounds let a covered tenancy end without any fault by the tenant. The first is move-in by the owner or the owner's spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent or grandparent, who must occupy the home as a primary residence for at least 12 continuous months, move in within 90 days after the tenant leaves, and be named in the notice with their relationship to the owner and a statement that the tenant may ask for proof; for a lease signed on or after July 1, 2020 the ground works only if the tenant agrees in writing or the lease allows it, and it is unavailable if the intended occupant already lives on the property or a similar unit is vacant. If the intended occupant does not move in or does not stay the 12 months, the owner must offer the home back to the tenant at the old rent and terms and reimburse the tenant's reasonable moving costs above any relocation payment; a death in that period is not a violation. "Owner" is defined narrowly for this ground, reaching a natural person with at least a quarter of the recorded ownership, or the whole ownership divided among named relatives, or a person holding through a company in which they hold at least a quarter. The second ground is taking the property off the rental market. The third is a government or court order, or a local ordinance, requiring the home to be vacated; if the tenant is found at fault for the condition behind it, no relocation payment is owed. The fourth is demolition or a substantial remodel, meaning permit-requiring replacement or substantial modification of a structural, electrical, plumbing or mechanical system, or abatement of hazardous materials such as lead paint, mold or asbestos, that cannot be done safely with the tenant in place and forces the tenant out for at least 30 consecutive days; painting, decorating and minor repairs never qualify, and the notice must carry a statement of intent, a verbatim paragraph offering the tenant the right to re-rent at the old rate, a description of the work with a copy of the permit, or the signed contractor contract where no permit is needed. A separate and older statute adds a fifth condition in cities and counties that control rents and register them: an owner who ends a tenancy for a move-in by the owner or an immediate relative must keep living there for at least six continuous months, and a court that finds the eviction rested on fraud may order three times the cost of moving the tenant back, three times any rent increase the tenant has paid, or three times one month's rent, plus fees and costs.

Relocation payment: On any no-fault ground the owner must, regardless of the tenant's income, either pay the tenant a relocation sum equal to one month of the rent in effect when the notice issued, delivered within 15 calendar days of serving the notice, or waive the final month's rent in writing before it comes due, with the notice stating the amount waived and that no rent is due for that month. The payment counts against any relocation assistance another law requires. Failure to comply strictly with the payment rule makes the termination notice void, and so does failure to comply with any other part of the statute.

The statute expires by its own terms on January 1, 2030.

Local ordinances: a statute expressly permits local just-cause rules. California expressly leaves room for local just-cause rules and says which one governs. A property covered by a local just-cause ordinance adopted on or before September 1, 2019 is governed by that ordinance and the state statute does not apply to it. An ordinance adopted or amended after that date governs only if it is more protective, which the statute defines by three tests that must all hold: its ground requirement is consistent with the state statute; it further limits the reasons for termination, raises relocation amounts, or adds tenant protections; and the local government has made a binding finding in the ordinance itself that it is more protective. A property is never subject to both, and a later ordinance that is less protective cannot be enforced while the state statute stands. Two further savings clauses keep local authority intact: the residential notice section says it does not affect a public entity's existing authority to regulate or monitor the basis for eviction, and the landlord-harassment section says it neither enlarges nor diminishes local authority over harassment. The separate question of how far a city may regulate the amount of rent is answered on the rent-increase page, where California is not preempted and also carries a statewide cap; that answer does not change the just-cause rules described here.

For a tenancy the statute covers, an owner may not end it, or decline to renew it, without a just cause stated in the written termination notice. The statute sets no notice period of its own: the days come from the notice sections, so a covered month-to-month tenancy takes the 60-day or 30-day period plus a stated ground. At-fault grounds include a tenant's refusal, after a written request from the owner, to sign a renewal or extension of a written lease that ended on or after January 1, 2020 on similar terms of similar length; a curable violation must be met with a cure notice first. The no-fault grounds and the relocation payment are described above. Any waiver of the tenant's rights under the statute is void as contrary to public policy. Non-compliance with any provision voids the termination notice, and an owner who tries to recover possession in material violation is liable for the tenant's actual damages, in the court's discretion reasonable fees and costs, and up to three times actual damages where the owner acted wilfully or with oppression, fraud or malice; the Attorney General and a city attorney or county counsel may seek an injunction. The owner must also give the tenant a written notification that the statute applies, in the lease, as an addendum, or as a separate notice the tenant signs, in at least 12-point type. The statute is operative from April 1, 2024 and repeals itself on January 1, 2030. Outside the covered set, no reason is needed to end a periodic tenancy or to let a fixed term expire, though a landlord may not act because a tenant is a crime or abuse survivor, because a tenant asked for the locks to be changed, or because someone called for police or emergency help.

The term ends on its date; no statute requires notice from either side.

After the term, the statute presumes renewal or a periodic tenancy when rent is accepted. A holdover becomes a new tenancy only if the landlord accepts rent. Section 1945 says that where a tenant stays after the hiring expires and the landlord accepts rent, the parties are presumed to have renewed on the same terms and for the same time, but never more than one month where rent is payable monthly and never more than one year in any case. So a monthly-rent lease that is held over with rent accepted becomes a month-to-month tenancy on the old terms and the old rent. If the landlord does not accept rent, no new tenancy arises and the tenant is holding over unlawfully.

Automatic-renewal reminder: California requires no reminder before an automatic-renewal clause takes effect; it regulates the clause itself instead. A term in a residential lease providing that the lease renews or extends automatically if the tenant stays on, or fails to give notice of an intent not to renew, may be voided by whichever party did not draft the lease unless the clause appears in at least eight-point boldface type in the body of the agreement and a recital saying so appears in at least eight-point boldface type immediately before the tenant's signature line. Where the clause is voided, the ordinary rent-acceptance renewal presumption applies instead. Any waiver of this protection is void as against public policy.

A fixed-term lease ends on its own end date and neither side has to give notice. A tenant who stays on after the term expires without the landlord's permission is in unlawful detainer from that moment, so the landlord may go straight to court; a tenancy at will, by contrast, has to be ended by notice first. If the landlord accepts rent from the holdover tenant, the lease is presumed renewed on the same terms for the rent period, capped at one month on a monthly lease and at one year in any case. Where the just-cause statute covers the tenancy, declining to renew is itself a termination and needs a stated ground, so in practice a covered fixed term cannot simply be allowed to lapse. Where the parties fix no length, the tenancy is presumed to run for the period used to set the rent, and monthly if nothing was agreed. California has no statute requiring notice of non-renewal before a fixed term ends; the automatic-renewal type rule described above is a form requirement, not a reminder duty.

A tenant who stays after a fixed term expires without the landlord's permission, or after a valid termination notice has run, is guilty of unlawful detainer and the landlord may file for possession without any further notice. A tenancy at will is different: it has to be ended by notice under the Civil Code before the tenant can be in unlawful detainer. A holdover becomes a month-to-month tenancy only where the landlord accepts rent.

Damages: California has no double-rent or other multiplier for a holdover. The court or jury assesses the damages the holdover actually caused the landlord and finds the amount of rent due, and where the tenant is found guilty of unlawful detainer and malice is shown the landlord may be awarded statutory damages of up to six hundred dollars on top of actual damages, including the rent found due; the trier of fact decides whether to award actual damages, the statutory sum, or both. A good-faith holdover carries no enhancement at all. One limit runs the other way: on a nonpayment case where the lease has not expired by its terms and the notice did not declare a forfeiture, the court may, and on a lease longer than a year without a forfeiture clause must, hold the writ for five days after judgment so the tenant can pay the rent, interest, damages and costs and be restored to the tenancy. The court process itself is covered on the eviction page.

Yes, as a damages rule rather than an order to re-let: a statute reduces what the landlord may recover by what the tenant proves could reasonably have been avoided.

When it attaches: The damages formula applies from the moment the lease terminates, which section 1951.2 says happens when the tenant breaches and abandons the property before the end of the term, or when the landlord ends the tenant's right to possession for a breach. It is not limited to a formal abandonment procedure and it does not wait for a court finding.

Burden of proof: on the tenant.

The standard: The measure is the part of the loss that could reasonably have been avoided, and the tenant is the one who has to prove it. The landlord may recover the unpaid rent earned before the tenancy ended, plus the rent that would have been earned between then and the award to the extent it exceeds the loss the tenant proves could reasonably have been avoided, plus any other amount needed to make good the harm the tenant's failure caused. Rent for the period after the award is recoverable only if the lease says so or if the landlord actually re-rented before the award and proves the re-renting was done reasonably and in a good-faith effort to reduce the loss, and that future sum is discounted. Efforts to re-rent do not waive the landlord's damages claim.

A lease clause accelerating all remaining rent is enforceable only with an offset for re-letting or another limit.

Whether a lease may waive the duty is not settled.

California does not tell a landlord to go out and re-rent. It writes the rule into the damages formula instead, and it puts the proof on the tenant: the landlord's recovery is reduced by whatever part of the rental loss the departing tenant proves could reasonably have been avoided. That is the state's headline fact on this question, and it is the reverse of the usual arrangement. A landlord who wants the rent for the balance of the term after judgment must either have a lease clause providing for it or have actually re-rented and prove the re-renting was reasonable and in good faith, and that sum is discounted at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's discount rate plus one percent. A landlord may also decline to end the tenancy at all: where the lease contains the statutory clause naming this remedy and either permits subletting and assignment, permits it subject to standards that were reasonable when the lease was signed, or permits it with the landlord's consent not to be unreasonably withheld, the lease continues and the landlord may sue for the rent as it falls due; maintenance work, efforts to re-rent, appointing a receiver and withholding consent to a sublet do not count as ending the tenancy, and this route is lost once the landlord takes possession under a judgment. A landlord who ends the lease this way owes one notice duty: where the tenant paid more than one month's rent up front and asked in writing to be told, the landlord must send written notice of the first re-renting, naming the new tenant, the length of the new lease and the rent, within 30 days of the new tenant taking possession. The scheme does not reach a lease executed before July 1, 1971. No published California decision applies the formula to a residential lease; the appellate cases on it arise from commercial leases, so the posture rests on the statute.

A statute or appellate decision voids early-termination fees or liquidated damages in a dwelling lease.

California voids early-termination charges in a dwelling lease outright, and the rule is easy to miss because it takes two sections to state. Section 1951.5 says that section 1671, on liquidated damages, applies to a lease of real property. Section 1671 then says that where liquidated damages are sought from a party to a lease of real property used as a dwelling by that party or their dependents, the clause is void, with one narrow exception: the parties may agree in advance on an amount presumed to be the damage where, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage. A commercial lease gets the opposite treatment, where such a clause is valid unless shown to be unreasonable. So a flat buy-out fee or a months-of-rent early-termination charge in a residential lease starts void, and the landlord's route to money is the actual-damages formula described under the duty to reduce losses. Three narrower bans sit alongside it: no fee may be charged for serving, posting, or delivering a termination notice; no early-termination charge may be imposed on a service member's termination; and a survivor who ends a lease may not be made to forfeit the deposit or advance rent, nor charged lease termination fees after a court removes only the perpetrator. Two figures in California law are not fee caps and should not be read as such: the six-hundred-dollar holdover award and the survivor's 14-day rent liability. This answer rests on the statutes rather than on California's administrative regulations; the state publishes them through a commercial service rather than a state host, and the rules above rest on the statutes.

Early-exit rights by ground: domestic violence and related grounds, a statutory right to end the lease; military service beyond the federal act, state orders or National Guard duty are covered; death of the tenant, no statute; and other statutory grounds.

Domestic violence and related grounds: a victim may end the lease on notice.

Who qualifies: A tenant may end the lease where the tenant, a household member, or an immediate family member was the victim of any of eight things: domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, abuse of an elder or dependent adult, a crime that caused bodily injury or death, a crime involving the exhibiting, drawing, brandishing or use of a firearm or other deadly weapon, or a crime involving force or a threat of force against the victim. The last three make California's list the broadest in the country: it is a general violent-crime right, not only a domestic-violence right. A household member is a family member living in the same unit; an immediate family member is a parent, stepparent, spouse, child, child-in-law, stepchild or sibling, or anyone who was living in the household when the act happened and whose relationship with the tenant is substantially like a family member's. There is no requirement that the tenant hold a protective order, and no requirement that the act have happened at the home, except in one situation: where the victim is an immediate family member who did not live in the household at the time and no part of the act happened in the unit or within 1,000 feet of it, the tenant must add a written statement that the family member was a victim, that the tenant intends to relocate because of it, and that the move is to increase the safety, physical, emotional, psychological or financial well-being of the tenant or that family member.

Documentation: The written termination notice must have one of four things attached, and any one of them is enough. The first is a temporary restraining order, emergency protective order, or protective order. The second is a copy of a written report by a peace officer acting in an official capacity stating that the tenant, household member, or immediate family member has filed a report alleging the act. The third is a statement on the two-part form the statute reproduces word for word, signed by a sexual-assault counselor, a domestic-violence counselor, a human-trafficking caseworker, a victim of violent crime advocate, or a California-licensed physician and surgeon, osteopathic physician and surgeon, registered nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, or professional clinical counselor; for the counselor, caseworker and advocate routes the form must be on the letterhead of the office, hospital, institution, center or organization that employs them. The fourth is any other form of documentation that reasonably verifies the act occurred, which makes the list open-ended, but a tenant who uses only that fourth route cannot recover the statutory damages the section otherwise provides. The landlord may not pass what the tenant supplies to anyone else.

Window: 180 days; the tenant must give notice within that window after the incident. The tenant has 180 days to give the notice, counted from whichever of three events the tenant relies on: the date a protective order was issued, the date a written police report was made, or the date the act or crime happened. The statute adds a fourth alternative, allowing the notice within the time period the general notice section describes. It is a deadline for the tenant to act, not a limit on how old the incident may be, and the landlord has no power to extend it. A different 180-day rule appears in the separate section that lets a tenant defend an eviction on the same grounds: there the documents themselves must be no more than 180 days old. The two windows measure different things and should not be merged.

Notice: none required; the tenant may leave at once. There is no waiting period. The written notice with its documentation ends the tenancy, and California states no number of days between giving it and the tenancy ending. What the statute does instead is cap what the tenant owes afterwards at 14 days' rent. That 14-day figure is a liability cap and is not a notice period, and reading it as one overstates how long a survivor must stay on the hook.

Rent owed: The tenant is responsible for rent for no more than 14 calendar days after giving the notice, or for a shorter period if the general notice section or the lease provides one, and is then released without penalty from any further rent or other payment obligation under the lease. If the home is re-rented to someone else before that period runs out, the rent owed for it is prorated.

Cost to the tenant: The landlord may not require the tenant to forfeit any security deposit money or advance rent because of the termination, and the tenant is not to be treated, for any purpose, as having breached the lease by ending it this way. In every other respect the ordinary deposit rules apply, and those are covered on the deposits page. A landlord who violates the section owes the tenant actual damages plus statutory damages of at least one hundred and at most five thousand dollars, except where the tenant relied only on the open-ended fourth documentation route.

Other tenants on the lease: the lease continues for the other tenants and the victim is released while the lease continues. The release reaches the tenant who is, or whose household member or immediate family member is, the victim, and it reaches the members of that tenant's household. Everyone else on the lease stays bound by it. Nothing in the section conditions the release on the remaining tenants' ability to pay or requires a new lease or new screening. A separate remedy in an eviction case lets a court remove only the person who committed the abuse, keeping the tenancy in place for everyone else.

Locks: The victim may require the landlord to change the locks. California gives the survivor a lock change at the landlord's cost, and it runs on a 24-hour clock. Where the person responsible is not a tenant of the same unit, the landlord must change the locks of the tenant's unit at the landlord's own expense within 24 hours of a written request supported by documentation, and give the tenant a key. If the landlord does not, the tenant may change the locks without permission whatever the lease says, provided the work is done in a workmanlike manner with locks of similar or better quality, the landlord is told within 24 hours and given a key; the landlord must then reimburse the tenant within 21 days. That rule reaches leases signed on or after January 1, 2011. Where the person responsible is a tenant of the same unit, the same 24-hour, landlord-expense, 21-day structure applies but the trigger is a copy of a court order excluding that person from the unit, issued within the last 180 days; the landlord is not liable to the excluded person for the lock change, and the excluded person stays liable under the lease along with the other tenants. The documentation accepted for a lock change mirrors the termination list, including the open route of any documentation that reasonably verifies the abuse or violence, and the tenant chooses which form to supply. Locks means any exterior lock giving access to the unit.

Later screening: a landlord may not deny, refuse to renew, or terminate because of victim status or a past victim-status termination. A dedicated screening statute, added in 2024, bars a landlord or agent from taking an adverse action in tenant screening on any of four grounds: an allegation that the applicant breached a lease where the alleged breach stemmed from an act of abuse or violence against the applicant, an immediate family member or a household member and the applicant is not alleged to have committed it; the applicant having previously asked for the locks to be changed, whether or not the request was granted; the applicant, or an immediate family or household member, having been a victim of abuse or violence; and the applicant or a guest having previously called for police or emergency help as, or for, a victim or a person in an emergency. Adverse action means denying the application or approving it on different and less favorable terms, and a violation costs the landlord actual damages plus statutory damages of one hundred to five thousand dollars. The termination section adds its own bar: an owner or agent may not refuse to rent to an otherwise qualified applicant, or refuse to keep renting to an existing tenant, solely because that tenant has used the termination right or has previously ended a tenancy for these reasons. A separate section makes the actual or threatened termination or non-renewal of a tenancy a forbidden penalty for summoning law enforcement or emergency assistance, voids any lease term limiting that right, and gives the tenant a rebuttable presumption where the landlord files for eviction within 30 days of such a call.

The landlord must keep the victim's documentation or status confidential.

The landlord's side: The landlord may contact the qualified third party who signed a statement to confirm what it says, and that contact is not a disclosure. A landlord who has received documentation of abuse or violence may not end or refuse to renew the tenancy because of the act, with two exceptions: where the person responsible is a tenant in residence of the same unit, and where that person's words or actions have threatened the physical safety of other tenants, guests, invitees or licensees and the tenant keeps letting them onto the premises after a three-day notice to stop. A landlord who complies with those rules is not liable to any other tenant for doing so, and a landlord who changes the locks under a court exclusion order is not liable to the excluded person. In an eviction case a landlord may ask the court for a partial eviction removing only the person responsible; the court then orders that person out, does not end the tenancy, and orders the landlord to change the locks and give the remaining occupants a key.

A tenant may end the lease by giving the landlord written notice that the tenant, a household member, or an immediate family member was the victim of one of eight listed acts, ranging from domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking and elder abuse to any crime causing bodily injury or death, any crime involving a firearm or other deadly weapon, and any crime involving force or a threat of force. One of four kinds of documentation must be attached, and the last of the four is any documentation that reasonably verifies the act, though relying only on that route costs the tenant the statutory damages remedy. The notice must be given within 180 days of the protective order, the police report, or the act itself. There is no waiting period: the tenancy ends on the notice, the tenant owes rent for no more than 14 calendar days afterwards, prorated if the home is re-rented sooner, and no deposit or advance rent may be forfeited. The victim's household is released; other tenants on the lease are not. The landlord must keep what the tenant supplies confidential, must change the locks at the landlord's own expense within 24 hours of a documented request, and may not use victim status, a past termination on these grounds, a lock-change request, or a call for emergency help against an applicant or tenant. California requires no notice of this right in the lease itself.

Military service: State orders or National Guard duty are covered.

When the state rights attach: The right reaches a lease of a home occupied, or meant to be occupied, by a service member or their dependents where the tenant either enters a period of military service during the lease term, or, already in service, signs the lease and then receives orders for a permanent change of station or to deploy for at least 90 days. California's definition of military service is what makes this more than a restatement of the federal act: for a member of the state militia it includes full-time active state service as well as full-time active federal service, and for anyone else full-time active duty for more than seven days in any 14-day period. Dependents do not have a right of their own to start a termination; the service member's termination ends a dependent's obligation under the same lease, and a dependent may claim the chapter's other benefits only by applying to a court.

A service member may end the lease at any time after entering military service or after the date of the orders, by delivering written notice and a copy of the orders to the landlord or the landlord's agent, by hand, by private carrier, or by mail with return receipt requested. On a monthly-rent lease the termination takes effect 30 days after the first rent due date following delivery of the notice; on any other lease it takes effect on the last day of the month after the month the notice was delivered. Rent for the period before that date is prorated, no early-termination charge may be imposed, and rent paid in advance for any period after the termination must be refunded within 30 days. Taxes, fines and other obligations already due, including reasonable charges for excess wear, still have to be paid. The landlord may apply to a court before the termination date to have the relief modified as justice and equity require. Anyone who seizes or holds the departing tenant's belongings, furniture or deposit to press a claim for rent accruing after the termination commits a misdemeanor. California also bars any eviction of a service member's spouse, children or other dependents from a home occupied mainly as a dwelling until 120 days after the service member is released from active duty, except by leave of court, with no rent ceiling on the protection; that rule belongs to the eviction page.

Death of the tenant: No statute gives a right to end the lease on the tenant's death.

Other grounds: California adds one further statutory route out and lacks several that other states have. The route it has is the lodger rule: where a single lodger rents a room in a dwelling the owner occupies, either side may end the arrangement on the same notice the general section requires, and when the notice period runs out the lodger's right to remain ends by operation of law, with removal handled under the Penal Code rather than by an eviction case. There is no early-termination right for a job transfer or a change of employment, none for a move into a care facility, senior housing or a nursing home, and none for landlord harassment, though a tenant harassed into leaving has a civil penalty claim of up to two thousand dollars for each violation and separate remedies for a lockout or a utility shutoff. Ending a lease because the home is not habitable, and protection against retaliation, are covered on the habitability page.

The landlord serves a notice of belief and the tenant has a window to respond. The tenant's window to respond is 15 days.

Answering the presumption or notice: The lease ends on the date the landlord's notice names unless, before that date, the tenant gives the landlord written notice saying the tenant does not intend to abandon the home and stating an address at which the tenant may be served by certified mail in an eviction case. Four things defeat the abandonment even after the date passes: the rent was not in fact due and unpaid for 14 consecutive days when the notice was given; it was not reasonable for the landlord to believe the home had been abandoned, and knowing that the tenant left belongings behind does not by itself show the belief was unreasonable; the tenant did give the written notice in time; or the tenant paid all or part of the unpaid rent at any time from 14 days before the notice through the date the lease would have ended.

California ends the tenancy through a notice of belief of abandonment rather than by presuming the tenant is gone. The landlord may give the notice only where rent has been due and unpaid for at least 14 consecutive days and the landlord reasonably believes the tenant has abandoned the home. The date the notice names must be at least 15 days after it is served personally, or at least 18 days after it is deposited in the mail. The statute reproduces the notice word for word, so the form itself is prescribed. It is served by personal delivery or by first-class mail to the tenant's last known address and, where there is reason to think that address will not reach the tenant, to any other address the landlord knows of where the tenant might reasonably receive it. If the tenant does not answer as described above, the home is deemed abandoned and the lease ends, which is what starts the landlord's damages formula. The procedure is not exclusive, so either side may still prove abandonment another way, and it does not stand in for the notice that begins an eviction case. This section covers homes only; a differently worded twin with different periods covers commercial property and should never be read across. What the landlord may do with property the tenant leaves behind is covered separately.

A termination notice is delivered in the manner the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes for an eviction notice, or by certified or registered mail. The prescribed manner is a hierarchy, not a menu: first, hand a copy to the tenant; only if the tenant is absent from both home and usual place of business, leave a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and mail a copy to the tenant's home; and only if neither home nor business can be found, or no suitable person is there, post a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, hand a copy to anyone residing there who can be found, and mail a copy to the property. Certified or registered mail is the extra route the Civil Code adds, and it is not available for an eviction notice, so California's termination service rules are the eviction rules plus a mail option. A tenant may also serve the owner's agent, by delivering a copy in person or sending it by certified or registered mail to the agent the tenant paid rent to for the month before the notice. Where the tenancy is a single lodger in an owner-occupied home, the notice goes by certified or registered mail with restricted delivery and a return receipt. Anyone may serve the notice; no sheriff or marshal is required. A separate looser list applies to commercial tenants and does not reach dwellings.

Electronic delivery: the statute lists the permitted methods and excludes it.

Mailing adds no days to the period. Mailing a termination notice adds nothing to the notice period. California's general five-day extension for service by mail does not reach these notices: the Court of Appeal held in 1998 that the service and notice provisions of the eviction statutes and the general mail-extension rule are mutually exclusive, so the mail rule does not extend a notice period that is a prerequisite to filing. A 30-day or 60-day notice therefore runs from the day it is properly served, however it was served, and a landlord who counts extra days is giving the tenant more time than the law requires rather than curing a defect. The one place California does add days for mailing is the abandonment notice, where the date named must be at least 15 days out if served in person and at least 18 days out if mailed.

What the notice must contain: Four content rules apply, and they stack. Every landlord's termination notice must carry, word for word, the statutory paragraph telling the former tenant that state law lets them reclaim property left behind, that costs may apply depending on storage and delay, and that costs are lower the sooner they get in touch; a tenant's notice carries nothing. Where the just-cause statute covers the tenancy, the notice must state the ground. Where the ground is a no-fault one, the notice must also state the relocation election, and where the owner elects to waive the last month's rent it must state the amount waived and that no rent is due for that month. Where the ground is a move-in, the notice must name the intended occupant and their relationship to the owner and tell the tenant they may ask for proof; where it is demolition or a substantial remodel, the notice must state the intent, reproduce the statutory paragraph offering the tenant the right to re-rent at the old rate, describe the work and attach a copy of the permit or, where no permit is needed for hazardous-materials work, the signed contractor contract, and give notice of the tenant's interest in reoccupying. Failing any provision of the just-cause statute voids the notice, and California courts require strict compliance with the service rules for a notice to be valid at all.

Language: The termination notice itself does not have to be translated. The written notification an owner must give a covered tenant that the just-cause statute applies is different: it must be in at least 12-point type and is subject to the state's foreign-language contract statute, which requires a business that negotiates primarily in Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese or Korean, in speech or writing, to deliver a translation of every term and condition before a dwelling lease longer than one month is signed. So where the tenancy was negotiated in one of those five languages, the coverage notification must be translated too.

Alternate address: There is no general right for a tenant to name an address for termination notices. One narrow rule works this way in the abandonment procedure: the landlord must send the notice of belief of abandonment to the tenant's last known address and, where there is reason to think it will not reach the tenant there, to any other address the landlord knows of where the tenant might reasonably receive it, and the tenant's written answer must state an address at which the tenant may be served by certified mail in an eviction case.

California layers its own protections on top of the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act instead of copying it. Its definition of military service reaches a militia member on full-time active state service, which the federal act does not; its lease-termination section bars any early-termination charge and requires advance rent to be refunded within 30 days; and it bars eviction of a service member's spouse, children or dependents until 120 days after release from active duty, with no rent ceiling on the protection. The federal Violence Against Women Act gives no right to end a lease early; California's survivor termination right is state law and should not be attributed to it.

The federal CARES Act 30-day notice to vacate for covered properties, as read in this state's courts: no state appellate decision construes it. No California appellate court has decided whether the federal CARES Act's 30-day notice for covered dwellings still applies. California is therefore neither an expired jurisdiction like Iowa or Arizona nor a nonpayment-only jurisdiction like Washington: the question is simply open here, and a landlord of a federally backed or subsidized property should expect to meet it unresolved. (Appellate picture read as of September 2, 2026.)

Losornio v. Motta, 67 Cal.App.4th 110, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 (1998) (California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One; residential lease; bears on how a notice is delivered): A month-to-month residential tenant was served with a 30-day termination notice by posting it on the premises and mailing a copy, and the landlord filed on the thirty-first day. The court held that the service and notice provisions of the eviction statutes and the general five-day mail-extension rule are mutually exclusive, so the mail rule does not extend a notice period that must run before an eviction case may be filed. The court also restated that a 30-day or 3-day notice is valid and enforceable only where the landlord has strictly complied with the statutory service requirements.

Danner v. Jarrett, 144 Cal.App.3d 164, 192 Cal.Rptr. 535 (1983) (California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two; arose from a commercial lease; bears on the duty to re-let): A landlord who ends a defaulting tenant's right to possession, and obtains an eviction judgment declaring the lease forfeited, is not barred from later suing for damages under the statutory formula for a tenant who leaves before the end of the term. The case arose from a commercial lease of more than ten years, so it decides the statute's reach rather than any residential question, and the statutory formula itself is what governs a dwelling.