How does a Connecticut landlord lawfully end a tenancy, and when may a tenant leave early?

Chapter 830 and the notice-to-quit and summary process sections do not reach six arrangements: residence in an institution, public or private, that is incidental to detention or to medical, geriatric, educational, counseling or religious service; occupancy under a contract of sale of the dwelling or of the property it is on, where the occupant is the buyer or a person who succeeds to the buyer's interest; occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in a building it operates; transient occupancy in a hotel, motel or similar lodging; occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit; and occupancy by a personal care assistant housed in the residence of the disabled employer. Inside the covered set, one right is gated by the age of the lease rather than by the property: the victim-termination right is available only on rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2011 for family violence and on or after January 1, 2014 for sexual assault.

Two switches. The first is the nature of the arrangement: a reader works through the six excluded categories, and the transient-lodging one turns on a stay of 30 days or more together with the guest's intention to make the room a primary residence. The second is a date: a tenant checks when the current rental agreement was signed or last renewed, because the victim-termination right did not exist for agreements older than the two cut-offs, and a renewal after the cut-off brings the agreement inside it.

The switch changes: every answer on this page.

Landlord: 3 days. Tenant: the statute states no tenant period.

The three days are counted back from the moment the tenancy lapses, or back from a later date the notice itself names, whichever the landlord uses; they are not counted forward from delivery and they have nothing to do with the rent-due date. Because an open-ended monthly tenancy is treated as a run of one-month leases, the lapse falls at the end of the current month, so a notice to quit served on the 5th does not put the tenant out on the 8th: it must land at least three days before the end of a monthly period and the tenancy ends at that period's close. A landlord who names a later quit date in the notice may do so, and the three days then run back from that date instead.

The termination date must fall on a rental-period boundary or a rent-due date.

A lease may not change the period. A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant agrees to waive or forfeit rights or remedies under chapter 830 or under sections 47a-21 and 47a-23 to 47a-23b, among others, or under any other statute or municipal ordinance unless that statute or ordinance expressly says the right may be waived. The notice-to-quit section sits inside that named list, so a lease cannot cut the three days down or contract the requirement away, and a provision that tries is unenforceable. The bar runs one way only: it protects the tenant, and nothing stops a lease from giving the tenant more notice than the statute does.

Source of the period: only the eviction notice to quit exists, and it doubles as the termination notice.

Connecticut has no statute setting a notice period to end a month-to-month tenancy. What it has is the notice to quit that starts a summary process case, and the three-day figure comes from there. Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term the tenancy is month to month, or week to week where the tenant pays weekly rent, and an open-ended monthly agreement made by word of mouth is construed as a lease for one month only. Each month is therefore its own short lease that ends by lapse of time, and lapse of time is one of the grounds on which the landlord may serve a notice to quit possession. The notice must reach each tenant or occupant at least three days before the tenancy lapses, or before the later date the notice names. Two service situations carry ten days instead of three: where the tenant is a non-resident of Connecticut at the time notice is to be given, and where the tenant has gone to parts unknown. Nothing in the landlord-tenant chapters imposes or even mentions a notice a tenant must give to end a periodic tenancy, so the tenant's side of this row is empty as a matter of statute; what obligation the general law imposes on a departing tenant is not settled by any statute Connecticut has written.

Only for a defined subset of tenancies. The protection reaches a tenant who satisfies a property test and a personal test at the same time.

How a tenancy comes inside the rule: the landlord-tenant statute itself defines coverage.

Who is covered: The property test: the tenant lives in a building or complex of five or more separate dwelling units, or in a mobile manufactured home park. A complex is two or more buildings on the same or contiguous parcels under the same ownership, a park is a parcel with five or more homes, and a park resident is covered even where the resident owns the home. The personal test: the tenant is 62 or older, or lives permanently with a spouse, sibling, parent or grandparent who is; or the tenant is a person with a physical or mental disability as the anti-discrimination statute defines it, or lives permanently with a spouse, sibling, child, parent or grandparent who is, but only where the disability can be expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. There is a further overlay for common-interest communities: a conversion tenant is covered, and a non-conversion tenant only where the landlord owns five or more units in that community. Everyone else in Connecticut may be put out without a reason once the notice to quit has run.

No-fault grounds: Three of the seven permitted grounds involve no fault by the tenant: refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, permanent removal of the unit from the housing market, and the landlord's genuine intention to use the unit as a principal residence. All three are barred during the term of an existing rental agreement, so they can only be used once the term has run out, and the principal-residence ground is not available to the owner of a unit in a common-interest community occupied by a conversion tenant. A fair and equitable rent increase is measured by the criteria the municipal fair rent statute sets, and a protected tenant who thinks an increase is not fair may take it to the town's fair rent commission where one exists or to the Superior Court where none does.

Local ordinances: no statute or decision addresses them. No Connecticut statute preempts a municipal just-cause or eviction-grounds ordinance, and none expressly authorizes one; the landlord-tenant and summary process chapters say nothing either way. Connecticut's municipal machinery in this area runs on the rent side instead: the protected-tenant statute assumes the existence of fair rent commissions and sends a protected tenant's rent-increase complaint to the commission for the town, city or borough where the unit or park lot is, and to the Superior Court where the municipality has none. Local rent regulation is not preempted at all, and the rent-increase page carries that posture and the commissions themselves.

Most Connecticut tenants may be put out without a reason. A defined group may not. Where the tenant lives in a building or complex of five or more units, or in a mobile manufactured home park, and is 62 or older or has a long-term disability, or lives with a close relative who is, the landlord may bring a summary process or other dispossession action only on one of seven grounds: non-payment of rent; refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase; material non-compliance with the tenant's statutory duties or with the mobile-home-park equivalent that materially affects the health and safety of other tenants or the physical condition of the premises; voiding of the rental agreement for the uses the statute names, or material non-compliance with the rental agreement; material non-compliance with the landlord's rules and regulations properly adopted; permanent removal of the unit from the housing market; and the landlord's genuine intention to use the unit as a principal residence. The last three grounds are also written into the notice-to-quit statute, so the protection and the notice run through one document. A landlord may ask a tenant to prove protected status, and the tenant then has 30 days to provide it, including a statement from a physician or an advanced practice registered nurse where blindness or another physical disability is claimed. Since January 1, 2024 the landlord must also give the tenant a written notice of these rights on every rental and every renewal in a covered building, complex or park, using the one-page plain-language summary the Department of Housing publishes in English and Spanish; five more languages are due by December 1, 2028.

The term ends on its date; no statute requires notice from either side.

After the term, no statute governs conversion; the common-law rule applies. No statute converts a Connecticut holdover into a new tenancy. The statute says the opposite: holding over after the term expires is not evidence of any agreement for a further lease. A new tenancy arises only where the landlord acquiesces in the tenant staying on, in addition to the holding over, and where the parties disagree about an essential term of the supposed new tenancy no lease is implied at all. A landlord who wants the tenant out after the term still serves the notice to quit, because lapse of time is one of the grounds it may be served on.

A Connecticut fixed term ends on its own date. No statute requires either side to give notice that a term will not be renewed, and no statute requires the landlord to remind the tenant before an automatic-renewal clause takes effect. The important half of the rule is what does not happen next: holding over after the expiration of the term is not evidence of any agreement for a further lease, so the tenant does not roll into a month-to-month tenancy by staying. What the landlord still needs in order to get possession is the notice to quit, since the tenancy having terminated by lapse of time is itself a ground for serving one. The absence of an automatic-renewal reminder is stated for the landlord-tenant chapters; Connecticut's general consumer law on automatic renewals sits elsewhere in the statutes and is not covered here.

A Connecticut holdover is a tenant at sufferance, not a renewed periodic tenant, because holding over is not evidence of any agreement for a further lease. Where there is no agreement about the terms of the continued occupancy, the tenant at sufferance is liable for the reasonable rental value of the premises. The landlord still goes through the notice to quit and summary process to recover possession.

Damages: No statutory enhancement: the landlord recovers ordinary rent or use and occupancy.

Connecticut attaches no statutory penalty to holding over. There is no double rent, no treble damages and no percentage a lease may charge; the landlord recovers the reasonable rental value of the premises for the period of the holding over, and use-and-occupancy payments during the summary process case are the eviction page's subject. One statutory conversion runs the other way and is worth knowing: on a month-to-month or week-to-week tenancy, a notice to quit based on non-payment of rent terminates the rental agreement for the month or week in which it is delivered and turns the tenancy into a tenancy at sufferance the moment it is delivered, even where the notice goes out in the month or week after the one the rent is said to be unpaid for.

Yes: a statute imposes the duty.

When it attaches: The broader of Connecticut's two mitigation statutes attaches whenever a landlord who has ended a tenancy for a breach of the rental agreement sues for damages; it is not keyed to abandonment and it reaches commercial as well as residential tenancies. The narrower one attaches when the tenant abandons the unit, and abandonment has a statutory meaning: the occupants have left without notice to the landlord and do not intend to return, which may be shown by the removal of substantially all their possessions together with either more than two months of unpaid rent or an express statement that they will not occupy after a stated date. The Appellate Court has held that this definition governs the mitigation section too, so a tenant who says he is going but keeps paying rent, keeps up the property and keeps the keys has not abandoned and no mitigation duty arises.

Burden of proof: no authority allocates it.

The standard: On abandonment the landlord must make reasonable efforts to rent the unit at a fair rental in mitigation of damages, and the consequence of not trying is unusually sharp: the rental agreement is deemed to have been terminated by the landlord as of the date the landlord had notice of the abandonment, which cuts off the rent claim from that date rather than merely reducing it. In a damages action after a breach-based termination the statute states the obligation without elaborating on it, saying that damages include the rent agreed but unpaid and that the landlord is obliged to mitigate. Neither statute says who must prove that reasonable efforts were or were not made, and no Connecticut appellate decision allocates it in a residential case.

No authority addresses a clause accelerating the remaining rent.

The lease may not waive the duty.

Connecticut imposes the duty by statute twice over, and the two sections do different work. The abandonment section says that if the tenant abandons the dwelling unit the landlord shall make reasonable efforts to rent it at a fair rental in mitigation of damages, and that a landlord who does not is treated as having terminated the agreement as of the date he had notice of the abandonment. The damages section says that where a landlord ends a residential or commercial tenancy on the ground that the tenant breached the rental agreement and then sues for damages, those damages include the rent agreed but unpaid, and the landlord is obliged to mitigate. Because the second section is not tied to abandonment, the duty in Connecticut is general rather than abandonment-only. A lease cannot take either duty away: the prohibited-terms section voids any provision by which the tenant waives rights or remedies under the chapter, and both mitigation sections sit in it. Nothing in the chapters authorizes or bars a clause accelerating the remaining rent on default.

No statute addresses a fee a landlord may charge for ending a lease early; the general damages rules govern.

No Connecticut statute caps, authorizes or bars a fee for ending a residential lease early, and there is no statutory cap on the damages a landlord may recover from a tenant who leaves early; the mitigation duty is what limits the bill. Connecticut nevertheless regulates residential charges more closely than most states, and three rules bear on a departing tenant. A landlord may not charge any fee before or at the beginning of the tenancy except a security deposit, the first month's rent in advance, a deposit for a key or special equipment and a capped tenant-screening-report fee, and may not charge a move-in or a move-out fee at all; since the 2026 budget act those bans reach a third party acting for the landlord or for the state as well. A lease may not make the tenant pay attorney's fees above fifteen percent of any judgment against the tenant. And a tenant who ends the lease as a victim of family violence or sexual assault is released without penalty or liability for the remaining term. Advertised rent must include every fee the tenant will have to pay on a recurring basis, payments a tenant makes go first to rent and only then to other charges, and a landlord who breaks the advertising rule owes a civil penalty of one month's rent. This answer rests on the statutes rather than on Connecticut's administrative regulations; the landlord-tenant and summary process chapters delegate no rule-making at all, so there is no statutory hook a regulation capping such a fee could hang on.

Early-exit rights by ground: domestic violence and related grounds, a statutory right to end the lease; military service beyond the federal act, state orders or National Guard duty are covered; death of the tenant, related duties only, no termination right; and other statutory grounds.

Domestic violence and related grounds: a victim may end the lease on notice.

Who qualifies: A tenant who is a victim of family violence as the family-violence statute defines it, or a victim of sexual assault under the criminal sections the statute lists, or a parent or guardian with physical custody of a dependent who is the victim of sexual assault of a child. In every case the tenant must also reasonably believe it is necessary to leave the unit because of fear of imminent harm to the tenant or to a dependent. Stalking and human trafficking are not named anywhere in the landlord-tenant or summary process chapters, so a victim of either reaches this right only where the conduct also falls inside the family-violence definition, which turns on a family or household relationship.

Separate schemes: One section carries two grounds with different starting dates, and the date the lease was signed or last renewed decides which is available. The family-violence ground applies to rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2011; the sexual-assault ground applies to rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2014. The mechanics are otherwise identical: the same 30 days' written notice, the same sworn statement and the same documentation choice.

Documentation: The written notice must carry two things together. The first is a statement made under oath or affirmation that the tenant or a dependent is a victim of family violence or sexual assault, that the tenant intends to end the rental agreement and on what date, and that the tenant has already left and removed all possessions and personal effects or will do so before that date, anything left behind after it being abandoned. The second is either a copy of a police or court record detailing an act of family violence or sexual assault against the tenant or the tenant's dependent, or a signed written statement detailing such an act from an employee of the Office of Victim Services in the Judicial Department or of the Office of the Victim Advocate. The list is closed, and no third-party medical or advocate certification of the kind other states accept will do. The notice and the documentation go to the landlord together.

Window: 90 days; the incident or documentation must fall within that window before the notice. There are two windows and they differ by document. A police or court record must be dated not more than 90 days before the tenant's notice; a statement from the Office of Victim Services or the Office of the Victim Advocate must be dated not more than 30 days before it. The figure carried in this row is the 90-day window for the police or court record. Both windows run from the date on the document, not from the date of the act, so an older incident still supports a termination as long as the paperwork is recent enough.

Notice: 30 days; at least that many days must pass between the notice and leaving. The tenant picks the termination date and must give the landlord written notice at least 30 days before it. The landlord does not have to agree to the date. Thirty days is a floor rather than a fixed lead time, so a tenant who gives more notice is within the section, and the notice is not effective at all unless it carries the sworn statement and the qualifying document with it.

Rent owed: The tenant is released without penalty or liability for the remaining term, so rent stops on the date named in the notice. Two things survive the termination. The tenant still owes any rent arrears run up before it, and the tenant is still liable for property damage the tenant caused. Anything the tenant leaves in the unit past the termination date is abandoned by the tenant's own sworn statement.

Cost to the tenant: There is no early-termination fee, penalty or forfeiture for using the section; the release is expressly without penalty. The only charge the statute allows in this area is the cost of a lock change, which the landlord may bill at no more than the actual reasonable cost of doing it.

Other tenants on the lease: the lease continues for the other tenants. The statute says in terms that the termination does not relieve any other tenant from liability to the landlord under the rental agreement. The lease therefore continues against everyone else on it, and the section says nothing about re-screening them, requiring a new lease, or removing the person who caused the harm.

Locks: The victim may require the landlord to change the locks. The lock right is a separate section and it does not depend on ending the lease, so a tenant who is staying put may use it. On the tenant's request the landlord must change the locks, or let the tenant change them, where the tenant is named as a protected person in a protective or restraining order issued in Connecticut or in a registered order from another state, the order requires the respondent to stay away from the tenant's home or to keep a minimum distance from the tenant, and the tenant gives the landlord a copy. The landlord must say within six hours of the request whether he will change the locks or let the tenant do it, and if he is doing it himself he must finish within 48 hours. If he refuses, does nothing or misses the deadline, the tenant may change them in a workmanlike way with locks of similar or better quality and must give the landlord a key within two business days. The landlord pays the locksmith, must give the tenant a key at or before the change, and may bill the tenant no more than the actual reasonable cost; an unpaid lock-change fee may be sued for or taken from the security deposit but may never be the basis of a summary process action. An electronic lock may be reprogrammed instead of replaced.

Later screening: no statutory protection.

Deadline to move out: The tenant's own sworn statement fixes the deadline: the tenant must have left and removed everything by the termination date named in the notice, and anything still there is abandoned. Any occupant who has no right or privilege to be in the unit must also be out before that date, and if the tenant or such an occupant stays the landlord may bring a summary process action.

The landlord's side: Connecticut gives the landlord a route to test the notice that most states do not: the landlord may bring an action in the housing session of the Superior Court for an injunction to prevent the termination where the section's requirements have not been met. If the tenant or an occupant with no right to be there stays past the termination date, the landlord may bring a summary process action. Where a tenant living in the unit is the person the protective order requires to stay away, the landlord must not give that tenant a key to the new locks unless a court order allows a supervised retrieval of belongings. No confidentiality duty is placed on the landlord about the notice or the lock request.

Lease disclosure: Connecticut has no lease disclosure specific to victims, but it has two general ones that a landlord must get right. From April 1, 2026 no landlord may give a tenant a written rental agreement unless the first page of it is a completed copy of the standardized rental terms summary form the Department of Housing publishes in English and Spanish, which sets out the term, the landlord's name, a management contact, each tenant's name and the all-in periodic rent. And on every rental and renewal in a building or complex of five or more units, or in a mobile manufactured home park, the landlord must give the tenant the Department's one-page plain-language notice of the protected-tenant grounds and rent rules.

A tenant who is a victim of family violence, or of sexual assault, or a parent or guardian with custody of a child victim of sexual assault, and who reasonably believes it is necessary to leave because of fear of imminent harm, may end the rental agreement without penalty or liability for the remaining term by giving the landlord written notice at least 30 days before the date the tenant chooses. The notice must include a sworn statement of victim status, the termination date and the tenant's departure, together with either a police or court record dated within 90 days or a statement from the Office of Victim Services or the Office of the Victim Advocate dated within 30 days. The right depends on when the lease was made: family violence reaches agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2011, sexual assault those on or after January 1, 2014. Rent stops at the termination date, but arrears and tenant-caused damage survive, and every other tenant on the lease stays bound. Separately, and whether or not the tenant leaves, a tenant named as a protected person in a stay-away order may require the landlord to change the locks, with an answer due in six hours and the work done in 48. The landlord may go to the housing session for an injunction where the notice does not meet the section's requirements.

Military service: State orders or National Guard duty are covered.

When the state rights attach: The state right attaches only to a member of the Connecticut National Guard whom the Governor has ordered into active state service. It works by extending the federal act rather than by writing new lease mechanics, so the federal notice rules and effective dates apply, and the only carve-out is the federal act's life-insurance provisions, which are not part of the lease right. A Guard member on federal duty is already covered by the federal act itself.

Connecticut has no lease-termination statute of its own for service members, and the landlord-tenant and summary process chapters do not mention the military at all. What the state adds sits in the militia law: a member of the Connecticut National Guard whom the Governor orders into active state service has all the protections the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act gives to service members on federal active service, except the life-insurance provisions. The federal act's residential lease-termination right is not among the exceptions, so a Guard member on Governor-ordered state duty carries it. Connecticut writes no shorter deployment threshold, no independent right for a spouse or dependents and no faster effective date for a lease. The same section does give a service member a right to end telecommunication, internet, television, satellite-radio and gym contracts on orders of 90 days or more, but that right does not reach tenancies.

Death of the tenant: A statute addresses the deposit, rent, or property after death but gives no termination right. No Connecticut statute lets the estate, a representative or a survivor end the lease because the tenant died. Any right to terminate on death is contractual: the statute that deals with the death of a sole occupant is available to the landlord only where the landlord has complied with whatever provision the lease itself makes for termination on death, and even then it is an election the landlord may make rather than a duty. Where the landlord does elect it, the route runs through the Probate Court rather than through a notice to quit. The landlord sends notice, by both regular mail and certified mail with return receipt requested, to the tenant's designated emergency contact and to known next of kin, stating the death, the intention to remove possessions and re-rent, a direction to contact the landlord or the Probate Court, and that anything unclaimed 60 days after the notice will be disposed of. An affidavit goes to the Probate Court with jurisdiction, an inventory follows on or after 30 days, possessions are held 15 days before removal and stored securely for a further 15, and the Probate Court then issues a certificate the landlord files in the Superior Court, where the clerk opens a summary process file recording that the right to occupy has ended with the death; the certificate counts as a judgment. No notice to quit and no summary process trial are needed. What becomes of the possessions themselves is covered separately.

Other grounds: Connecticut gives a tenant one further statutory way out, and it is a good one. Where the unit or the premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty so badly that enjoyment of the unit is substantially impaired, and the tenant did not cause it negligently or wilfully, the tenant owes no rent for as long as the impairment lasts. The tenant may then leave at once and, within 14 days of doing so, tell the landlord in writing of the intention to end the rental agreement, which ends as of the date of leaving. A tenant who can lawfully stay may instead give up the unusable part of the unit and pay proportionately less. On a casualty termination the landlord must return all security and prepaid rent, and the accounting is done as of the date of the fire or casualty rather than the date the tenant left. There is no job-transfer ground, no care-facility or senior-move ground, and no age or disability exit right; Connecticut's protections for tenants who are 62 or older or disabled restrict eviction rather than give a way out. Ending a lease because the landlord has not kept the unit fit to live in is covered on the habitability page.

The landlord serves a notice of belief and the tenant has a window to respond. The tenant's window to respond is 10 days.

Answering the presumption or notice: The occupant stops the process simply by contacting the landlord within ten days of receiving the notice, using the telephone number and mailing address the notice must carry. No form and no reason are required. If nobody makes contact within the ten days, or if the notices come back undeliverable, the landlord may re-enter, and the tenancy ends at that moment. Belongings left behind may be reclaimed for 30 days after the notice.

Connecticut defines abandonment and then gives the landlord a notice route rather than a bright-line absence rule. Abandonment means the occupants have left without notice to the landlord and do not intend to return, which may be shown by their removal of substantially all their possessions and personal effects together with either more than two months of unpaid rent or an express statement that they will not occupy the unit after a stated date. Where all the occupants have abandoned, the landlord may send each of them notice at the last known address by both regular mail and certified mail with return receipt requested. The notice must be in clear and simple language, carry a telephone number and a mailing address for the landlord, and say four things: that the landlord believes the unit has been abandoned; that he intends to re-enter and take possession unless the occupant contacts him within ten days of receiving it; that if the occupant does not, he intends to remove the possessions and re-rent; and that possessions not reclaimed within 30 days of the notice will be disposed of. If no contact comes or the notices come back undeliverable, the landlord may re-enter, and any rental agreement or lease still running is deemed terminated at that point. That re-entry is the termination event, not the abandonment and not the notice. The landlord need not serve a notice to quit or bring a summary process action for an abandoned unit, but the section does not excuse him from doing so where he knows or reasonably should know the occupant has not abandoned, and a landlord who follows it is protected from an entry-and-detainer claim. The same definition drives the landlord's duty to re-let, so a landlord with notice of an abandonment who makes no reasonable effort to rent the unit is treated as having ended the tenancy himself. What may be done with the possessions is covered separately.

An attested copy of the notice to quit must be served by a proper officer, either on each tenant or occupant personally or by leaving it at that person's place of residence, and delivery may be made on any day of the week. There is no mail route for a residential notice to quit and there has been no delivery by an indifferent person since the 2025 amendment. Two situations have their own routes and their own longer period. Where the tenant is a non-resident of Connecticut when the notice is to be given, it may be served on the person in charge of the premises or, if nobody is in charge, in the way ordinary civil process is served, at least ten days before the date named in the notice. Where the tenant has gone to parts unknown, the notice may be advertised at least twice in a paper published in the county and circulating in the town, the first advertisement at least ten days before that date.

Electronic delivery: the statute lists the permitted methods and excludes it.

A termination notice must be served by an officer or other server the statute names.

What the notice must contain: The statute prints the form. The notice must be in writing and substantially in the form it gives: a statement that the landlord gives notice to quit possession or occupancy of the land, building, apartment or dwelling unit now occupied by the tenant, the address including the apartment number or other designation, the date on or before which the tenant is to go, the reason for the notice stated in the statutory language or words of similar import, and the date and place of signing. Where the landlord knows an occupant is there but not the name, the notice may be addressed to that occupant as John Doe, Jane Doe or another alias that reasonably describes the person. A termination notice required by federal law may be included in or combined with the state notice without making it equivocal, provided the tenancy does not end until the later of the date named in the notice and the completion of the federal pre-termination process; a disclaimer that later payments are taken for use and occupancy only, with rights reserved, may be combined in the same way.

Connecticut has a statutory hook for the federal overlay that most states lack. The notice-to-quit section expressly allows a termination notice required by federal law and regulations to be included in or combined with the state notice to quit without rendering it equivocal, so long as the tenancy does not end before the later of the date named in the notice and the date the federal pre-termination process is completed. Connecticut therefore runs the federal and state notices on one document, and the federal affidavit the courts require rides on the same case.

The federal CARES Act 30-day notice to vacate for covered properties, as read in this state's courts: no state appellate decision construes it. No Connecticut appellate decision construes the CARES Act's 30-day notice for covered dwellings. The one Appellate Court decision that mentions the Act in a summary process context, Colchester Estate Ventures, LLC v. Madden, decides a question about withdrawing and refiling an action and refers to the Act only in a footnote reciting what a trial court had found in a different case. What a Connecticut landlord actually meets is the Judicial Branch's own requirement: form JD-HM-41, the CARES Act Affidavit of Compliance, revised January 2026, must be filed in a residential summary process action, and it routes a property covered by the Act to the conclusion that a 30-day notice to quit is required. Two Superior Court decisions are cited in this area but they are unreported and trial-level, and they are not authority. (Appellate picture read as of September 3, 2026.)

2026 Conn. Pub. Act 26-113, § 1, signed June 4, 2026, takes effect October 1, 2026: The act republishes the prohibited-lease-terms section, which is the source of this page's rule that the notice to quit cannot be waived, and adds a new prohibited term: a lease may not require the tenant to pay for utilities billed to the tenant where no separate meter measures the utilities delivered exclusively to that tenant's unit. The anti-waiver rule itself is unchanged. The new term applies only to rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after the effective date, so a reader on an older agreement is not affected until it renews. Text: 2026 Conn. Pub. Act 26-113 (Substitute S.B. 335), An Act Concerning Utility Charges for Residential Dwelling Units.

2026 Conn. Pub. Act 26-11, § 15, signed May 7, 2026, takes effect October 1, 2026: A technical revision to the protected-tenant section. The definition a covered tenant relies on for a physical or mental disability is drawn from the anti-discrimination statute, and the act moves the internal cross-reference from one subdivision of that statute to another. Coverage does not change and no figure on this page moves; the entry exists so the citation does not go stale on the effective date. Text: 2026 Conn. Pub. Act 26-11 (Substitute S.B. 473), An Act Concerning the Revisor's Technical Revisions to the General Statutes.

Herron v. Daniels, 208 Conn. App. 75 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2021; residential lease; bears on the duty to re-let): In a residential case from the housing session, the court held that the statutory definition of abandonment in the abandonment-notice section supplies the meaning of abandons and abandonment in the mitigation section, which has no definition of its own: the tenant must have left without notice to the landlord and without intending to return, shown by removing substantially all possessions together with either more than two months of unpaid rent or an express statement of an intention not to occupy after a stated date. On the facts, a tenant who told the landlord's lawyer he would continue to perform the lease although he would not be present, kept paying rent, kept up the landscaping and did not hand back the keys until the term ended had not abandoned, so the landlord's duty to mitigate never arose and there was no early termination of the lease.

Colchester Estate Ventures, LLC v. Madden, 229 Conn. App. 811 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2024; a general statement of law; bears on the federal 30-day notice): The appeal concerns a summary process plaintiff's right to withdraw an action and bring a new one, and it decides nothing about the federal 30-day notice for covered dwellings. Its only reference to the CARES Act is a footnote recording what a trial court found in a separate later action, which is why Connecticut has no appellate authority construing that notice. It is listed here so the negative rests on the decision itself rather than on an assertion.