How does an Indiana landlord lawfully end a tenancy, and when may a tenant leave early?

Landlord: one calendar month. Tenant: one calendar month.

The unit Indiana uses is a calendar month, not a count of days: section 32-31-1-1 says a tenancy at will may be ended by a one-month notice in writing, and the phrase 'thirty days' appears nowhere in the termination chapter. The figure of 30 shown here is the calendar month expressed as days for comparison, and on a 31-day month a notice measured at 30 days is short. A year-to-year tenancy is anchored differently: the notice must be given not less than three months before the expiration of the year, and the statutory form directs the tenant to leave at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, so the tenancy ends at the year's end rather than three months after the notice. A periodic tenancy of not more than three months takes notice equal to the interval between periods, so a week-to-week tenancy takes one week and a two-month tenancy takes two months. One question is genuinely open in Indiana: whether a month-to-month notice runs a month from the day it is served or must carry the tenancy to the end of the following rental month. The Court of Appeals raised the point in 2017 and said the second reading was consistent with the general rule, but it decided the case on other grounds, so a landlord who serves a notice mid-month should expect the argument.

Whether the termination date must fall on a rental-period boundary or a rent-due date differs between tenancy types or is not settled by the statute; the rule for each is stated above.

Tiers: Three periods, chosen by the length of the tenancy's own period. A tenancy at will or a month-to-month tenancy takes one month's written notice. A year-to-year tenancy takes notice given at least three months before the year expires. Any periodic tenancy of not more than three months takes notice equal to the interval between periods, so a week-to-week tenancy takes a week. Nothing turns on how long the tenant has lived there, the type or size of the building, the landlord's other holdings, the tenant's history or where in the state the unit is.

The statute says nothing about agreeing to a different period.

Source of the period: a termination-notice statute states it.

A tenancy at will or a month-to-month tenancy is ended by one month's notice in writing delivered to the tenant; a year-to-year tenancy by notice given not less than three months before the year expires; and a periodic tenancy of three months or less by notice equal to the interval between periods. A general tenancy in which the tenant occupies with the landlord's express or constructive consent is treated as month-to-month, except on land used for agricultural purposes. The statute is written one way, from landlord to tenant, and it says nothing about a tenant's notice; the Court of Appeals has nevertheless stated the rule as one party giving one month's notice to the other and has applied the same section against a tenant who tried to end a tenancy by telephone, holding that a phone call and the return of keys were not the notice the statute contemplates. So a tenant leaving a month-to-month tenancy should give a month's written notice. Notice is not required at all in six situations listed in section 32-31-1-8: where the landlord agreed to rent for a specified period, where the contract fixes when the tenancy ends, where a tenant at will commits waste, where the occupant is a tenant at sufferance, where the contract requires rent in advance and the tenant will not pay it, and where no landlord-tenant relationship exists. Chapter 1 carries no clause allowing or barring a different agreed period, and no Indiana decision has settled whether a lease may change one; the six anti-waiver clauses elsewhere in article 31 all belong to other chapters. A permissive statutory form exists for the year-to-year notice, and the ending of a tenancy is separate from the eviction case, which the court process page covers.

No: no statewide rule requires a reason, and no statute expressly authorizes local ordinances.

Local just-cause or eviction-control ordinances: expressly preempted by statute. Indiana preempts the field by name and voids offending ordinances. Section 32-31-1-20(c) says a unit may not regulate, by ordinance or otherwise, the screening process a landlord uses, security deposits, lease applications, leasing terms and conditions, disclosures about the property, the lease or the parties' rights and responsibilities, the rights of the parties to a lease, or any fees a landlord charges, unless the General Assembly authorizes it; and any ordinance that violates the subsection is void and unenforceable. Leasing terms and conditions and the rights of the parties to a lease reach a local just-cause ordinance on their face. Subsection (b) separately bars a unit from regulating rental rates for privately owned property, which the rent-increase page carries and which records Indiana as preempting local rent regulation unless the legislature authorizes it. There is one carve-out, and it is narrow: the section does not apply to privately owned property that has received government funds or benefits specifically to provide reduced rents to low or moderate income tenants — but even there, section 36-1-3-8.5 still forbids a unit from adopting an ordinance that requires or would have the effect of requiring a landlord to take part in a federal Section 8 or similar program.

No Indiana statute requires a ground to end a periodic tenancy or to let a fixed term expire, and the Court of Appeals has said in terms that tenancies under the termination chapter may be ended without cause. The legislature confirmed the position as recently as 2020 from an unexpected direction: the retaliation section says that its bar does not stop a landlord from declining to renew a rental agreement at the end of its term or from raising rent to the market level, so non-renewal at term end is a permitted act even against a tenant who has complained. Localities cannot fill the gap, because section 32-31-1-20(c) makes an ordinance regulating leasing terms and conditions or the rights of the parties to a lease void and unenforceable. Two protective bars do exist and apply to every landlord: a landlord may not terminate, refuse to renew, refuse to lease, or retaliate because a tenant, an applicant or a household member is a protected individual under the victim chapter or has ended a lease under it, and the separate retaliation section protects a tenant who has complained about conditions, which the habitability page covers.

The term ends on its date; no statute requires notice from either side.

After the term, a statute supplies what a holdover becomes. Two rules operate and both matter. The statutory one, section 32-31-1-2, treats a general tenancy occupied with the landlord's express or constructive consent as a month-to-month tenancy; the trigger is the landlord's consent rather than the acceptance of rent as such. The common-law one, stated by the Court of Appeals, is that when a tenant holds over past a definite term the landlord may treat the tenant as a tenant or as a trespasser, and where the tenant keeps paying rent and the landlord does not evict, the parties are taken to have continued the tenancy on the expired lease's terms — and where the original lease ran for more than one year, the renewal runs a year at a time. That is the trap. A tenant holding over from a two-year Indiana lease whose landlord keeps taking the rent becomes a year-to-year tenant, and ending a year-to-year tenancy takes three months' notice before the year's end, not one month. Both rules give way to the lease: the Court of Appeals has enforced a clause providing that any holdover with the landlord's consent is a month-to-month tenancy, which let the landlord raise the rent on one month's notice.

A fixed-term lease ends on its date and neither side owes notice: section 32-31-1-8 says notice is not required to end a lease where the landlord agreed to rent for a specified period or where the contract fixes when the tenancy ends. Indiana has no statute requiring a reminder before an automatic-renewal clause takes effect and none requiring notice of non-renewal; the trade-regulation title, which carries Indiana's contract-renewal rules for other kinds of agreement, does not mention landlords at all. What fills the space is the holdover law described above, under which a landlord who keeps taking rent from a tenant who stays on may find the tenancy has renewed — month to month under the statute, or year to year at common law where the original lease ran longer than a year — unless the lease itself says what a holdover becomes.

A tenant who stays past the end of the tenancy without the landlord's consent is a tenant at sufferance, and section 32-31-1-8(4) says no notice at all is required to end that occupancy. Where the landlord consents, expressly or by conduct, the tenancy converts instead, as described under fixed terms.

Damages: No statutory enhancement: the landlord recovers ordinary rent or use and occupancy.

Indiana has no double rent, no treble damages, no percentage cap and no bad-faith enhancement for holding over; there is no holdover damages provision anywhere in the property title. What the landlord recovers is the rent and ordinary contract damages: section 32-31-1-17 makes an occupant of land without a special contract liable for the rent to the person entitled to receive it. Where the lease contains a savings clause preserving the landlord's claim for rent falling due after the tenant is put out, the Court of Appeals has enforced it, and has held that recovering possession and recovering those future rents are consistent remedies that may be pursued together — subject to the duty to re-let described below. A landlord who wants more than the rent has to find it in the lease.

What a consented holdover becomes: Where a holdover is accepted after a lease that ran longer than one year, the common-law renewal is year to year rather than month to month, which changes the notice needed to end it from one month to three months before the year expires.

Yes: an appellate decision imposes the duty; no statute does.

When it attaches: The duty attaches on the tenant's breach of the lease — in practice, the day the tenant leaves early and stops paying. Indiana has no statutory abandonment event to trigger it, and the duty does not depend on the lease containing a re-letting clause.

Burden of proof: on the tenant.

The standard: The landlord must use such diligence as a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances to re-let the premises, if possible. Rent actually collected from a replacement tenant is set off against what the departing tenant owes, so a landlord who re-lets successfully cannot also keep the full run of the old rent.

A lease clause accelerating all remaining rent is enforceable only with an offset for re-letting or another limit.

Whether a lease may waive the duty is not settled.

No Indiana statute mentions a duty to re-let; the duty comes entirely from the appellate courts and it is settled. A landlord must use the diligence a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances to re-let the premises where that is possible, and the obligation exists even where the lease contains no clause requiring the landlord to re-let. Where the landlord does re-let, the rents collected from the new tenant are set off against the departing tenant's liability; a court set aside a judgment for future rents on that ground rather than let the landlord take a windfall. The burden runs the way it does in only a handful of states: the duty stays with the landlord, but it is the tenant who abandoned the unit who must prove, as a defense, that the landlord did not use due diligence. One limit on that rule should be stated — it was decided in a case where the lease's re-letting clause was permissive, and Indiana's appellate courts have not said who carries the burden where a lease makes re-letting mandatory. A lease clause preserving the landlord's claim for rent falling due after the tenant is put out has been enforced and held not to undercut the duty, so acceleration-style savings clauses work in Indiana but are read against the set-off. No decision has addressed whether a lease may waive the duty outright.

No statute addresses a fee a landlord may charge for ending a lease early; the general damages rules govern.

No Indiana statute authorizes, caps or bars a fee for ending a residential lease early, so the lease governs, bounded by the landlord's duty to re-let and by the deposit rules, which the deposits page carries. The only statutory rule about the cost of an early termination is protective rather than a cap: a tenant who ends a lease as a victim under the victim chapter owes no other rent or fees that would be due only because of the early termination, and owes no damages or penalties at all where the termination comes at least 14 days before the right to occupy would have begun. Localities cannot supply a cap either, because section 32-31-1-20(c)(7) makes an ordinance regulating any fees charged by a landlord void and unenforceable. Indiana's administrative rules were read for a fee or disclosure rule and contain none: of the 187 administrative titles, only four belong to agencies whose subject matter could reach a residential lease, and none of their rules addresses lease termination or a tenant's fees.

Early-exit rights by ground: domestic violence and related grounds, a statutory right to end the lease; military service beyond the federal act, state orders or National Guard duty are covered and a deployment or transfer threshold below the federal act's; death of the tenant, related duties only, no termination right.

Domestic violence and related grounds: a victim may end the lease on notice.

Who qualifies: A tenant or applicant who is a victim, or an alleged victim, of one of three things: a crime involving domestic or family violence, a sex offense under the criminal code's sex-offense chapter, or stalking. Human trafficking is not covered, so a trafficking survivor has no lease-break right in Indiana. Two coverage gates apply on top of that. The chapter reaches only a rental agreement for a dwelling unit entered into or renewed after June 30, 2007. And because the chapter is one of the residential landlord-tenant statutes, the seven arrangements excluded from those statutes are excluded from it: a survivor living in a hotel or motel, in institutional or medical housing, in housing conditioned on employment, or in a condominium she owns has no rights under the chapter at all.

Documentation: Indiana's documentation rule is unusually demanding, because a court order is not merely proof: it is part of the definition of who is protected. A protected individual is a victim or alleged victim who has received either a civil order for protection issued or recognized by a court under the Civil Protection Order Act, restraining the perpetrator from contact, or a criminal no-contact order to the same effect. A survivor without one of those orders is not a protected individual for any purpose in the chapter, including the lock change and the anti-discrimination protections. No police report, medical record, advocate's statement or self-certification qualifies anywhere in the chapter. Because the order may be one 'recognized' by an Indiana court, an out-of-state protection order given effect here counts. On top of the order, and only where the tenant is a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, the notice must include a copy of a safety plan provided by an accredited domestic-violence or sexual-assault program that recommends the tenant relocate and is dated no more than 30 days before the notice. A stalking victim needs the order alone. The notice and the documentation go to the landlord together.

Window: 30 days; the incident or documentation must fall within that window before the notice. The 30 days is the maximum age of the safety plan, not a deadline running from the incident and not a limit on how old the violence may be. The plan must be dated no more than 30 days before the day the tenant gives the landlord written notice, so a tenant who obtains a plan and then delays more than a month must get a fresh one. Nothing in the chapter limits how recently the qualifying offense must have happened; what has to be current is the court order and, for domestic-violence and sexual-assault victims, the plan.

Notice: 30 days; at least that many days must pass between the notice and leaving. The tenant gives the landlord written notice of termination at least 30 days before the termination date stated in the notice, so the tenant names the date and 30 days is the minimum lead time rather than a fixed period. The notice must carry the qualifying court order with it, and the safety plan too where the tenant is a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault. The chapter prescribes no form beyond writing and those attachments.

Rent owed: The tenant owes rent and other expenses under the lease prorated to the effective date of the termination, payable at the times the lease would have required. Nothing is owed for the period after that date.

Cost to the tenant: Nothing beyond the prorated rent. The tenant is not liable for any other rent or fees that would be due only because of the early termination, and a tenant who ends the agreement at least 14 days before the right to occupy the unit would have begun is not subject to any damages or penalties. The deposit is treated generously and this is easy to get wrong: section 32-31-9-12(e) says the departing tenant is entitled to deposits, returns and other refunds as if the tenancy had ended by expiring under the lease's own terms, which overrides the chapter's rule letting the landlord wait 45 days. That 45-day wait applies as against the tenants who stay, not against the tenant who left.

Other tenants on the lease: the lease continues for the other tenants. The rights and obligations of the other adult tenants continue unaffected, whether the protected tenant leaves or the perpetrator is excluded by court order. The landlord need not return or account for the deposit tied to that lease until 45 days after the tenancy of all the tenants has ended, which is what the 45-day rule is for. A perpetrator excluded under a court order stays liable under the lease along with the other tenants for rent and for the cost of damage: Indiana keeps the abuser on the lease while shutting him out of the unit rather than shifting the survivor's obligations onto him.

Locks: The victim may require the landlord to change the locks. The lock change is a duty on the landlord, not a permission, and it runs on two clocks. Where the perpetrator is not a co-tenant, the landlord must change the locks within 48 hours of the tenant's written request accompanied by a copy of the qualifying court order, and must give the tenant a key to the new locks. Where the perpetrator is a co-tenant of the same unit, the deadline is 24 hours, the landlord may not do anything to give the perpetrator access unless the order allows a supervised visit to collect belongings, and the landlord is protected from a claim for excluding him or for damage to property he left inside. The tenant reimburses the landlord's actual cost. If the landlord misses the 48-hour or 24-hour deadline, the tenant may change the locks without permission and the landlord must reimburse the tenant, who then has 24 hours to give the landlord a key.

Later screening: a landlord may not deny, refuse to renew, or terminate because of victim status or a past victim-status termination. Section 32-31-9-8 bars a landlord from terminating a lease, refusing to renew, refusing to enter into a lease, or retaliating against a tenant solely because the tenant, an applicant, or a member of the tenant's or applicant's household is a protected individual, and separately from refusing to lease to an applicant or retaliating against a tenant solely because any of those three has ended a rental agreement as a protected individual. It therefore protects the survivor applying for the next apartment, not only the one already housed, and it reaches household members who are not on the lease. Like the rest of the chapter it depends on the tenant holding a qualifying court order, since that is what makes someone a protected individual.

The landlord's side: The chapter creates no affirmative rights for the landlord and one express protection: it does not make a landlord or a landlord's agent liable for the acts of a perpetrator or a third party, and a landlord who excludes a perpetrator under a court order is protected from a claim by him. The landlord may of course insist on the court order and, where the tenant is a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, the safety plan, because the termination only operates when they accompany the notice.

A protected individual — a tenant or applicant who is a victim or alleged victim of domestic or family violence, a sex offense or stalking, and who holds a civil protection order or a criminal no-contact order restraining the perpetrator — may end the lease by giving the landlord written notice at least 30 days before the termination date named in the notice, with a copy of the order attached, and, if the tenant is a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, a safety plan from an accredited program recommending relocation and dated within the previous 30 days. The tenant then owes rent prorated to that date and no other rent or fee arising only from the early termination, and nothing at all where the notice comes at least 14 days before occupancy would have begun; the deposit is settled as though the tenancy had run to its natural end. Other adult tenants stay bound, and an excluded perpetrator stays liable. The landlord must change the locks on request within 48 hours, or 24 hours where the perpetrator is a co-tenant, and the tenant may do it herself if the landlord does not. Three limits define the Indiana right: it covers leases entered into or renewed after June 30, 2007 only, it does not reach human trafficking, and without a court order there is no right at all.

Military service: State orders or National Guard duty are covered and a deployment or transfer threshold below the federal act's.

When the state rights attach: The state extension attaches to a Guard member ordered to active duty, including state active duty, for at least 30 consecutive days. A landlord is not exposed to the state remedies for failing to honor it unless the member, or the member's dependent, gives the landlord documentation that the member is a Guard member ordered to state active duty for at least that long. The extension changes who counts as being in military service; it does not change the federal act's own notice and effective-date mechanics.

Indiana adds nothing to the federal act's lease mechanics and a great deal to who may use them. Section 10-16-7-23(b) applies the rights, benefits and protections of the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act — which includes its residential lease-termination right — to a member of the Indiana National Guard or of another state's National Guard ordered to active duty for at least 30 consecutive days, and subsection (a) defines active duty to include state active duty under an order of Indiana's governor or of another state's governor. A Guard member called up by a governor for a month, service that carries no federal protection of its own, may therefore end a residential lease in Indiana on the federal act's terms, and a member of another state's Guard living here is covered too. A separate chapter, the Indiana Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, makes a violation of the federal act a violation of state law, defines military service more broadly than the federal act for Guard members, and lets the Attorney General sue for an injunction, restitution, costs and a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per violation. Two limits should be read alongside it. That chapter's own early-termination right covers telecommunications, internet, television, gym and satellite-radio contracts and not dwelling leases. And it gives a dependent the rights a dependent has under the federal act's second title, which is the stay-and-default title; the lease-termination right sits in the third title, so a dependent does not get an independent lease-break from this provision. Finally, an Indiana court may extend the federal act's protection for guarantors to someone liable on a covered Guard member's obligation, which matters where a parent has guaranteed a student lease.

Death of the tenant: A statute addresses the deposit, rent, or property after death but gives no termination right. Indiana has a mandatory regime for a sole occupant's death — and, unusually, for a sole occupant the landlord believes is incapacitated and absent — but it never says the tenancy ends. Where the landlord knows of the death, or believes the tenant is incapacitated and away, the landlord must notify the tenant's representative, must give the representative access at a reasonable time to remove personal property, may require a signed inventory of what is taken, and must pay the representative the tenant's security deposit and unearned rent that the tenant would otherwise have been entitled to. The duty to hand over unearned rent is the closest the statute comes to saying the tenancy has stopped running. Who counts as the tenant's representative is a six-rung ladder: a person the tenant designated in a writing delivered to the landlord, then a person named in the lease, then an attorney in fact, then a temporary guardian or guardian of the person, then an heir, then someone a probate court appoints, with the probate court settling disputes. The representative accepts by written notice to the landlord, and an heir's, attorney's or guardian's authority ends when a personal representative is appointed. A landlord who complies is protected from claims by the tenant, the estate and third parties; a landlord who wilfully fails to comply owes actual damages to the tenant or the estate.

No statute treats absence as ending the tenancy; the common law governs.

No Indiana statute ends a tenancy because the tenant has gone, and there is no notice of belief of abandonment and no window for the tenant to answer one. What Indiana does have is two statutory definitions of abandonment with two different jobs, and neither terminates the lease. A dwelling unit is abandoned, under section 32-31-5-6(b), where the tenants have failed to pay or offer to pay the rent due and the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would conclude they have surrendered possession — a two-part test with no absence period. Its effect is to switch off the bar on the landlord's self-help, so on abandonment the landlord may change the locks, enter and retake the unit without a court order. Personal property is abandoned, under section 32-31-4-2(b), where a reasonable person would conclude the tenant has vacated and surrendered the property; that provision shields the landlord from liability for loss or damage, but removing the property still needs a possession judgment and a further court order. Both definitions carry the same protection for the tenant: a lease may not define abandonment differently from the statute, so a clause deeming a unit abandoned after a stated number of days' absence does not work in Indiana. Because abandonment does not end the tenancy, the departing tenant's rent liability continues, limited by the landlord's duty to re-let. What may be done with property left behind is covered separately from this page.

Section 32-31-1-9 sets a three-rung ladder and each rung is available only when the one above it fails. The notice may be served on the tenant. If the tenant cannot be found, it may be served on a person residing at the premises, and the person serving it must explain its contents to the person served. If no such person is found on the premises, it may be served by affixing a copy to a conspicuous part of the premises. There is no mail route at all: certified mail is not among the methods, so a landlord who mails a termination notice has not used a statutory method.

Electronic delivery: the termination statute is silent on it.

What the notice must contain: The statute prescribes nothing the notice itself must say, beyond that a tenancy at will is ended by a notice in writing. Permissive forms are supplied for the year-to-year termination notice and for the ten-day nonpayment notice, and both may be used rather than must be. One requirement is easy to miss and is a condition of valid service rather than advice: where the notice is served on a person residing at the premises because the tenant cannot be found, the person serving it must explain the contents of the notice to the person served.

The federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act's lease-termination right and the federal Violence Against Women Act's protections apply in Indiana as everywhere, and the state adds one thing of substance to the first: section 10-16-7-23(b) applies the whole federal servicemember act, lease-termination right included, to Indiana and other states' National Guard members ordered to active duty, including a governor's state active duty, for at least 30 consecutive days. A separate state chapter makes a violation of the federal act a violation of state law and puts an Attorney General enforcement action and a civil penalty behind it. The federal housing law for victims gives no right to break a lease, and Indiana's own victim chapter is keyed to state criminal definitions rather than to it.

The federal CARES Act 30-day notice to vacate for covered properties, as read in this state's courts: held in force by a state appellate court, with the notice to run before the case is filed, in a case about unpaid rent that did not decide whether other grounds are reached. Hazelwood v. The Common Wealth Apartments, 231 N.E.3d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), a published decision, holds that the federal 30-day notice for covered dwellings did not expire with the 120-day eviction moratorium and that a landlord of a covered dwelling must give the notice before filing for possession: the court reversed a possession order won by a subsidized landlord that had filed without giving it and directed that the claim be dismissed. The eviction was for unpaid rent, and the court did not decide whether the notice also governs other grounds. A concurring judge would have held that the requirement lapsed when the national emergency ended on April 10, 2023, and applied it only because the unpaid rent fell before that date; the majority did not adopt that view. The Indiana Supreme Court has not ruled on the point, and Indiana has not written the notice into its own statutes. (Appellate picture read as of September 4, 2026.)

Barber v. Echo Lake Mobile Home Community, 759 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on ending a periodic tenancy): A month-to-month tenancy may be terminated by one party giving one month's notice to the other, and such tenancies may be terminated without cause; the grounds for ejecting a resident of a mobile home community under the health code do not displace that right. The tenancy was residential, for a mobile home lot.

Eppl v. DiGiacomo, 946 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on ending a periodic tenancy): A tenant's telephone call announcing that she was leaving did not amount to the notice required to end a month-to-month tenancy, and handing back the keys was not by itself a surrender the landlord accepted; the court applied the one-month notice section to a tenant's own attempt to terminate. The tenancy was an apartment.

Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on ending a periodic tenancy): An eviction complaint is difficult to characterize as the statutory notice ending a month-to-month tenancy, because filing it presupposes a breach; reviewing the earlier decisions, the court recorded that none had squarely decided whether the month runs from service or to the end of the following rental period, and described as consistent with Indiana law the general rule that a notice given during one month takes effect at the end of the following month. It reversed and remanded without holding. The tenancy was a residence.

Houston v. Booher, 647 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (Indiana Court of Appeals; arose from a commercial lease; bears on the end of a fixed term): Where a tenant under a lease for a definite term holds over, the landlord may treat the tenant as a tenant or as a trespasser; absent an agreement to the contrary, where the tenant continues to pay rent and the landlord does not evict, the parties are taken to have continued the tenancy on the expired lease's terms, and where the original lease ran for more than one year the renewal runs a year at a time. The lease was commercial, a dental-office sublease.

Fields v. Conforti, 868 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on the end of a fixed term): A month-to-month tenancy may be ended, or the rent changed, by the landlord giving the tenant one month's notice; and a lease clause providing that any holding over with the landlord's consent is a month-to-month tenancy was enforced, so the landlord could raise the rent on a month's notice. The lease was residential, with an option to purchase.

Nylen v. Park Doral Apartments, 535 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on the duty to re-let): A landlord must use such diligence as a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances to re-let the premises in order to reduce the damages caused by the tenant's breach, and the obligation exists even where the lease contains no clause requiring re-letting; recovering possession and recovering rent falling due afterwards under a lease savings clause are consistent remedies that may be pursued together without undercutting that duty. The lease was a residential student apartment.

Merkor Management v. McCuan, 728 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on the duty to re-let): A landlord must use the diligence of a reasonably prudent person to re-let the premises, and where those efforts succeed the departing tenant is entitled to a set-off in the amount of the rent collected from the replacement tenant; a default judgment for future rents was set aside because the landlord would otherwise have received a windfall. The tenancy was a residential townhome.

Sandor Development Co. v. Reitmeyer, 498 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Indiana Court of Appeals; arose from a commercial lease; bears on the duty to re-let): Where the lease's re-letting clause is not mandatory, the burden of proof is on the tenant who abandoned the premises to show, as a matter of defense, that the landlord did not exercise due diligence, but the duty to reduce the damages still rests on the landlord. The lease was commercial, for space in a shopping center.

Hazelwood v. The Common Wealth Apartments, 231 N.E.3d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (Indiana Court of Appeals; residential lease; bears on the federal 30-day notice): The federal 30-day notice to vacate for covered dwellings did not expire with the 120-day eviction moratorium, and a landlord of a covered dwelling that filed for possession without first giving it violated federal law; the possession order was reversed and the claim ordered dismissed. The tenant was a rent-subsidized apartment resident behind on rent, and the court did not decide whether the notice reaches other grounds. A concurring judge would have held that the requirement ended with the national emergency on April 10, 2023, but applied it because the unpaid rent predated that day.